ABSTRACT. During the Second World War, attention turned to reconstructing the world economy by moving away from competitive devaluations, protectionism and economic nationalism that had marred the 1930s. The Americans had considerable economic and political power, and they wished to restore multilateral trade, fixed exchanges and convertibility of currencies. The British government was in a difficult position, for it faced a serious balance of payments deficit and large accumulations of sterling in the Commonwealth and other countries. Multilateralism and convertibility posed serious difficulties. This address considers whether the American government had economic and financial hegemony after the war, or whether it was constrained; and asks how the British government was able to manoeuvre between America, Europe and the sterling area. The result was a new trade-off between international monetary policy, free trade, capital controls and domestic economic policy that was somewhat different from the ambitions of the American government and from British commitments made during and at the end of the war.
In the first age of globalisation of the late nineteenth century, a particular policy trade-off emerged in Britain: fixed exchange rates, free capital movements, free trade and an inactive domestic monetary policy. In the second address, we saw how this trade-off changed from fixed exchanges on the gold standard to competitive devaluations; from capital mobility to controls; from open markets to imperial preference; and from passive to active domestic monetary policies through the pursuit of low interest rates. The result was that Britain experienced more rapid economic recovery than many other advanced industrial economies -but there were also serious shortcomings. Unemployment remained persistently high at a minimum of 10 per cent; total volumes of world trade declined; and nationalistic economic policies throughout the world prepared the ground for warfare. The experience of the 1930s meant that attention during the war soon turned to a new trade-off within the 'inconsistent quartet' that has been discussed in this series of presidential addresses. In this address, I will focus on the outcome at the two major conferences that shaped the post-war world: the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 that created a new international monetary regime; and the Havana conference of 1948 that shaped the trade regime. Together, they set the parameters for British economic policy for the next quarter of a century, until the collapse of the monetary regime in the aftermath of Richard Nixon's decision of 15 August 1971 to suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold, and the entry of Britain into the European Economic Community in 1973.
The task facing British politicians and officials was a formidable one: the country faced a serious economic and financial crisis, and was apparently at the mercy of a hegemonic United States which was deeply suspicious of British trade policies, urging an end to imperial preference and a swift return to non-discrimination and multilateralism. The Americans were also anxious to return to fixed exchange rates and convertibility of currencies which would be extremely difficult given the weakness of Britain's balance of payments and the scale of Britain's commitments to the sterling area. But was America quite so hegemonic in practice? Could the British government cling to imperial preference and sustain a role for sterling in the face of American pressure? The outcome involved much more than a technical issue of economic policy, for it was also intimately connected with definitions of British identity, whether as part of a dollar-denominated Atlantic world, the sterling area based on the Commonwealth or a European currency zone. The choice also had implications for domestic economic policy, for a swift return to convertibility might entail the creation of a more flexible, market-based economy and a shift away from controls and regulations. These issues were central to British politics in the decade after the war. In this address, I will focus on the outcomes of the debates at the end of the war which created the system that survived until the early 1970s, before turning next time to the dissolution of this particular trade-off and the emergence of another under which we still live -barring any immediate collapse of the world financial system.
In the Anglo-American discussions that provided the basis for the wider agreement reached between forty-four nations represented at Bretton Woods in 1944, priority was given to reestablishing currency stability as a prerequisite for the recovery of trade. In his opening address to the conference, Henry Morgenthau, US secretary of the Treasury from 1934 to 1945, explained the priority of currency disorders to the downfall of the world economy:
All of us have seen the great economic tragedy of our time. We saw the worldwide depression of the 1930s. We saw currency disorders develop and spread from land to land, destroying the basis for international trade and international investment and even international faith. In their wake, we saw unemployment and wretchedness -idle tools, wasted wealth. We saw their victims fall prey, in places, to demagogues and dictators. We saw bewilderment and bitterness become the breeders of fascism, and, finally, of war. 1
Why did Morgenthau and the participants at the conference give priority to currency disorders?
Morgenthau believed, and many others agreed, that the depression of the 1930s started from currency disorders and then spread to trade; it was therefore best to fix the monetary problems first in order to create financial stability for the reemergence of multilateral trade. He, and many other leading figures in the American administration, believed that the emphasis of the Department of State under Cordell Hull on reducing trade barriers in the 1930s was inadequate. Hull was a reincarnation of Richard Cobden and his belief that free trade would link together the world in prosperity and peace. The outbreak of war showed that the policy had failed. Morgenthau complained that Hull was 'obsessed by his trade agreements and. . .failed to realize that Japanese militarism and European fascism had released new and ugly forces which. . .could not be controlled politely'. Cobdenism was not enough, for in the words of Harold Ickes, secretary of the Interior, it was 'like hunting an elephant in the jungle with a fly swatter'.
2 Further, monetary policy was technical and could be left in the hands of experts, unlike trade policy which had been a highly controversial electoral issue in Britain since the days of Joseph Chamberlain's campaign for tariff reform. During the Second World War, it continued to divide economists. The economic advisers to the British government were split between believers in the virtues of free trade, such as Lionel Robbins and Roy Harrod, and adherents of protection and imperial preference such as Hubert Henderson -with Keynes steering a pragmatic course between the two.
3 It was better to start with something that could be dealt with in a reasonably dispassionate manner, and where there was a degree of consensus.
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The initial need was to fix monetary disorder, but the experience of fixed exchange rates in the 1920s showed a potential danger: the nationalistic backlash against globalisation arose because domestic prosperity had apparently been sacrificed on the altar of the gold standard. Many economists and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic realised that the only way to contain this threat in future was to ensure that domestic prosperity was not undermined by policies designed for international reasons. In the words of Ragnar Nurske, a leading economist at the League of Nations, 'the problem was to find a system of international currency relations compatible with the requirements of domestic stability'.
5 Hence the first article of the new International Monetary Fund (IMF) that emerged from Bretton Woods was a commitment to 'the promotion and maintenance of employment and real income, and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy'.
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Our analysis of the 'trilemma' suggests that the pursuit of domestic prosperity with international currency stability was only possible by sacrificing capital mobility so that interest rates could in future be used to maintain full employment at home without provoking international capital flows and pressure on the exchanges. Keynes saw very clearly that the free movement of capital was incompatible with an active domestic monetary policy: 'The whole management of the domestic economy depends upon being free to have the appropriate rate of interest without reference to the rates prevailing elsewhere in the world. Capital control is a corollary to this.' Hence the Bretton Woods agreement followed the line of Bertil Ohlin, a leading Swedish economist and expert on trade theory: whereas the movement of goods 'is a prerequisite of prosperity and economic growth', the movement of capital was not. The Bretton Woods conference therefore sacrificed capital mobility and article VI section 3 of the articles of agreement of the IMF stated that 'members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements'. As Keynes said, 'what used to be a heresy is now endorsed as orthodox'.
Of course, general agreement on the need to resolve monetary issues did not completely remove dissension between the British and the American architects of the Bretton Woods agreement. Keynes and his American counterpart, Harry Dexter White, the assistant secretary of the Treasury, had two different visions of the post-war order. The story of the negotiations leading up to Bretton Woods is well known and does not require detailed retelling here -a clash between Keynes's clearing union and White's stabilisation fund. 8 Keynes argued that the monetary system should allow adjustments by the creditor nation (the USA) to avoid the problems experienced at the end of the First World War when debtor countries bore the brunt of adjustments through deflation to force down their costs in order to be more competitive. Given the prospect of a huge American trade surplus after the Second World War, the rest of the world would lack dollars which would create a problem for liquidity to fund world trade. Keynes felt that the USA should be obliged to reduce its surplus and that liquidity should be created through an international currency or 'Bancor'.
The Americans were suspicious, fearing that the result would be inflation and manipulation of currencies for selfish ends. The White scheme was more rigid and triumphed at Bretton Woods: it did not create an international currency; adjustments were to be made by the debtors and not by the USA. Competitive devaluations which led to 'beggar my neighbour policies' in the 1930s were banned. The dollar was pegged to gold at $35 per ounce -an arbitrary figure based on nothing more than the level to which Roosevelt allowed the price of gold to rise in the 1930s. 9 Other currencies were then pegged to the dollar within a margin of 1 per cent either way. Modest devaluations were permitted, with the right to make a larger change to the rate if there were a 'fundamental disequilibrium' between exchange rates, with no right to object that domestic policies were the cause of the problem. 'Fundamental disequilibrium' was not defined, and Per Jacobssen, managing director of the IMF, later remarked that he could no more define it than he could a pretty girl -though 'you can recognize one when you meet one'.
10
In theory, all exchange controls were to be removed after a five-year transition period and full convertibility restored.
The American position largely triumphed in the negotiations leading to Bretton Woods -not surprisingly, given the economic and financial power of the United States. What happened when White's scheme collided with economic reality after the war? Could the Americans utilise their post-war economic hegemony to impose their preferred policies; or was economic hegemony constrained in ways that allowed Britain to secure more than at first sight seemed possible? The modification of White's scheme was crucial to British economic policy and to its identity after the war as an Atlantic, imperial or European nation.
The Bretton Woods agreement was not easily implemented. There were four major issues. The first was a serious shortage of dollars after the war, for the USA would have a massive trade surplus as other countries turned to it for industrial goods during reconstruction. There was a serious problem in securing dollars to pay for imports from America, and a threat to the liquidity of the world economy. How was the dollar deficit to be covered without a serious fall in living standards? Although the European Recovery Program or Marshall Aid covered some of the dollar shortfall, what would happen when it came to an end? Was the deficit transitional, or was it long term and structural? The second issue was how Britain should respond to its balance of payments deficit. The post-war export drive to earn dollars meant that domestic consumption was held down and a policy of austerity adopted. Would the swift restoration of convertibility help by imposing discipline at fixed exchange rates so that an outflow of funds would lead to deflation and cost cutting; or would this approach lead to domestic political difficulties as well as putting pressure on the exchanges? An alternative solution was to reject fixed exchanges and allow the pound to float -a strategy that would entail a rejection of the Bretton Woods scheme. This was closely connected with a third issue: the treatment of the sterling area. Other countries held large balances of sterling accumulated during the war in payment for goods, and convertibility would mean they would switch into dollars to buy American goods. So long as sterling remained inconvertible, these countries were more or less obliged to buy British goods; convertibility would threaten British exports to these 'soft' markets as well as creating a run on the pound. Further, a decision to devalue the pound would have a serious impact on these colonies and countries in the sterling area which would find that their holdings were worth less.
Initially, the American government took a firm line, pressing for a swift return to convertibility. In 1947, the American government made a loan to Britain conditional on ending the period of transition, insisting that the British government should remove exchange controls and make sterling convertible. This was a triumph of hope over experience. Holders of previously inconvertible sterling rushed to switch into dollars, the loan was rapidly used up, and convertibility was suspended within weeks.
11 The American administration now realised that the European dollar shortage needed to be solved. The problem, it seemed to them, was a lack of production in Europe and the solution was a Customs Union in western Europe to create a large single market with American assistance through the European Recovery Program. Once the European dollar deficit was overcome, it would then be possible to move to an open international economy. The attitude of the British government was different. Although aid was obviously welcome as an alternative to domestic deflation, the dollar shortage was considered to be less the fault of European production than of the USA, and there was considerable scepticism about European integration. After all, Britain had major non-European markets, imperial preference remained a central policy, and the sterling area was central to Labour's economic policy.
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Discussion over trade issues started from 1941 in the context of Lend Lease. Article VII of the Lend Lease agreement of 1942 laid down that the final settlement should 'be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations'. Dean Acheson, who was a member of the American team, felt that the article was too idealistic: 'So far so good; here was a blow struck for the Hull liberal commercial policies open to all. Then came the apple of discord. In addition to promoting good, the final settlement should prohibit evil, or what Mr Hull thought was evil.' The article added that the settlement should 'provide against discrimination in either the United States of America or the United Kingdom against the importation of any product originating in the other country'. In other words, the article was directed against imperial preference which led Keynes to 'burst into a speech such as only he could make', complaining that 'it saddled upon the future an ironclad formula from the Nineteenth Century', and would require an imperial conference to secure the consent of the members of the Commonwealth. Acheson pointed out that the undertaking was not onerous in reality, merely promising that after the war was over, and after receiving considerable aid, Britain would not be free to take measures against the USA. Article VII provoked six months of discussion before it was agreed on 23 February 1942, and it continued to cause difficulties after the war. As Keynes realised from the outset, the USA would have a massive trade surplus and other countries would have difficulties in paying so that removal of preferences and quantitative restrictions would not be simple.
13
Of course, Hull was a proponent of the 'ironclad formula' of Richard Cobden. In his memoirs, he remarked that in 1916 he embraced the views he was later to pursue as secretary of state. Until that year, he believed that lower tariffs would reduce prices for American consumers and prevent the growth of trusts and monopolies. After it, he stressed international considerations: unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair competition, with war. . .if we could get a freer flow of trade. . .so that one country would not be deadly jealous of another and the living standards of all countries might rise, thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds war, we might have a reasonable chance of lasting peace.
In 1916, he proposed a post-war international trade conference to remove 'destructive commercial controversies', and in 1917 Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points called for the end of international trade barriers.
14 Hull's ambitions were not fulfilled after the First World War; they had more chance of success after the Second World War. Keynes was not impressed by the 'lunatic proposals of Mr Hull', and in his initial plans for postwar institutions he still argued that Britain should retain its protectionist measures, and that anyone who abandoned them 'would be as great a traitor to his country as if he were to sign away the British navy'.
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One reason for the success of the conference at Bretton Woods was that Hull was absent and attention could focus on the less contentious currency schemes. However, trade policy did not disappear from consideration and was not left entirely to Hull and his Cobdenite certainties. More realistically, James Meade put forward his plan for a 'commercial union' in 1942. This scheme would complement Keynes's 'clearing union' and it was accepted by the Board of Trade and discussed with the Americans in 1943 and then again in December 1944. Meade started by pointing to Britain's commercial problems at the end of the war, with its high dependence on imports of necessities and its need to increase exports of goods which other countries could more easily do without. 'If ever there was a community which had an interest in the general removal of restrictions to international commerce, it is the United Kingdom.' In the past, British trade had been multilateral: British exports went to less-developed areas (above all, India) and the proceeds were used to buy goods from the USA. Multilateral trade was therefore necessary to improve Britain's position, which meant reducing American tariffs from their high pre-war levels and the system of bilateral trade adopted by Germany in the so-called 'Schachtian' policy which was followed by many other countries. He therefore argued for a general policy of financial and economic expansion to increase purchasing power in export markets and 'a removal of those discriminations and rigidly bilateral bargains which remove the opportunities for multilateral trading'. Self-interest as well as the commitments of Article VII meant that Britain was committed to such a policy.
Hull might agree with Meade up to this point, but then they parted company. In Meade's opinion, 'Multilateral trading and the removal of trade restrictions do not. . .imply laissez-faire, and are in no way incompatible with a system of state trading.' Further, After the war we shall not be in a good position in which we can afford unconditionally to abandon all protective devices. We cannot readily indulge in a unilateral policy of removing our protective armour and shall thus desire to retain the right to restrict purchases from, and to discriminate against, those countries which themselves retain highly protective commercial policies or which discriminate against ours. We shall, moreover, need to retain the right to impose more general restrictions on purchases of inessential goods or on unnecessary payments abroad so long as we are faced with an acute problem of restoring equilibrium to our international balance of payments.
Meade argued that the clearing union was essential for the reduction of restrictions on commerce and that solving the currency problem came first: 'it is only in a general milieu of economic expansion that the pressure on the balance of payments of debtor countries is likely to be sufficiently relieved to make possible a really effective lowering of protective devices'. Further, the clearing union would help stimulate the general expansion of demand which was a prior condition for the removal of trade restrictions. Meade proposed an International Commercial Union to reduce trade restrictions: preferences should not be offered to one member without being offered to all; members would reduce protective duties against each other; state trading would be allowed; and an international commission should be established to adjudicate on disputes.
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In October 1943, meetings were held with the Americans who were drafting their own report on commercial policy. Meade and Robbins countered American claims that preferences (as adopted in Britain) more than tariffs (used by the Americans) diverted trade from sound economic channels. Somewhat disingenuously, they argued that the USA was a federal union with 100 per cent preference between its members whereas Britain had a Commonwealth with less than 100 per cent preference. 'Why is our arrangement sinful and theirs virtuous?' The claim that the relationship between California and Massachusetts was akin to that between Britain and New Zealand was not likely to convince the Americans, and the British negotiators had to admit that unless action was taken to end their 'peculiarly wicked and dreadful' preferences, there was not likely to be progress on commercial policy.
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The American government hoped that solving the currency issue would soon lead to multilateral trade. Keynes differed and commented to Treasury officials in 1944 that currency multilateralism is quite distinct from commercial multilateralism and that the former does not imply or require the latter. Indeed, currency multilateralism has been in the past the normal state of affairs without in fact being accompanied by commercial multilateralism. The one no more implies the other in the future than it has done in the past. The fact that those who have a strong sympathy for the one are likely to have a strong sympathy for the other also seems to me to be beside the point. Moreover there is a large and important group. . .who are decidedly in favour of currency multilateralism but very dubious about commercial multilateralism. 18 Keynes saw potentially serious political difficulties: the commercial proposals were drawn up to satisfy American public opinion which meant they were likely to provoke opposition in Britain where there was already irritation over the terms of Lend Lease. He urged White not to misinterpret any hostile response as a reaction against internationalismrather, 'this country is immensely exhausted and has made sacrifices so far as encumbering the future goes, far beyond those of the other United Nations'. 19 Keynes hoped for a compromise but he had a very difficult task given the post-war weakness of the British economy which soon became apparent in 1945 during his negotiation of a loan from the Americans.
Hugh Dalton, the chancellor of the Exchequer, was concerned that the Americans might make elimination of imperial preference a condition for financial assistance in 1945 as they had for Lend Lease. He telegraphed to Keynes in Washington that
We have repeatedly expressed our willingness to consider preferences as part of a satisfactory tariff settlement, but not to treat them separately. Certainly, there will be very violent reaction here if preference issue is formally linked, not with commercial talks, but with financial deal. Indeed, a financial settlement otherwise acceptable might be wrecked on this issue.
If the Americans did make this mistake, Dalton suggested that Keynes should point out the difficulties of convincing the cabinet and parliament. As Dalton remarked, 'my task would be made hopeless if anyone can represent that a financial pistol has been held to our head on subject of Imperial Preference'. Further, Australia and New Zealand were committed to imperial preference, and the Americans should not attempt to bargain away their agreements with Britain. Of course, Frederick Vinson, the American secretary of the Treasury, denied that he was using a financial pistol to force Britain to make concessions: rather, his concern was to secure support in Congress. Keynes was reassured that he could work with Vinson for a mutually satisfactory solution.
This does not mean that the State Department does not hold strong doctrinaire views or that it will be easy for us to carry a satisfactory formula. But it does mean that the spirit and purpose of the principal negotiators on the American side are far removed from threats and that in the last resort they will try hard to meet us on any point which they believe we genuinely regard as vital. 20 Keynes was not normally so trusting or naïve; he was soon shown to be wrong.
In December 1945, agreement was reached for a line of credit of $3,750 million to purchase goods and services from the USA, to meet post-war deficits in the balance of payments, to maintain reserves of gold and dollars and to assist the United Kingdom to assume the obligations of multilateral trade. This credit would make it possible for the United Kingdom to relax import and exchange controls. . .and generally to move forward with the United States and other countries towards the common objective of expanded multilateral trade. 21 The financial pistol was indeed held to the head of the British government, and Attlee put a brave face on the deal. On the same day that he announced the Anglo-American financial agreement to the Commons, the Americans published their 'Proposals for consideration by an international conference of trade and employment.' The proposals started with a grand statement that collective measures designed to safeguard peace must be based not only on machinery to deal with disputes but 'on economic co-operation among nations with the object of preventing and removing economic and social maladjustments, of achieving fairness and equity in economic relations between states, and of raising the level of economic well-being among all peoples'. The foundation of such a policy was 'the attainment of approximately full employment by the major industrial and trading nations' which was essential to the expansion of international trade on which the full prosperity of these and other nations depends; to the full realization of the objectives of all liberal international agreements in such fields as commercial policy, commodity problems, restrictive business practices, monetary stabilization, and investment; and, therefore, to the preservation of world peace and security.
But in agreeing to achieve full employment, a country could not take measures which would create unemployment elsewhere or were incompatible with a commitment to promote an expanding volume of international trade.
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Attlee endorsed these proposals as a basis for discussion, and agreed with the broad objectives of a code of conduct for international commerce and its expansion. However, he also made his doubts clear. His Commons statement, which was cleared with the Americans, did not make a pledge to multilateralism and he stressed the need to control imports so long as necessary to restore the balance of payments. He gave more weight to the need for domestic policies to create high and stable employment as a condition for trade expansion than did the Americans. Also, he agreed to contract imperial preference with a very significant condition, that 'there is adequate compensation in the form of improvement in trading conditions between Commonwealth and Empire countries and the rest of the world'. The Dominions were independent agents and Britain could not unilaterally surrender their preferences. Neither did the proposals lay down in advance how far the process of reducing preferences should go: much would depend on how far the Americans would reduce their tariffs. Multilateralism could not be a one-way process of Britain surrendering its preferences; the Americans needed to open their own markets.
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Just how much would Attlee's ministers be able to achieve as negotiations started? Article VII and the Anglo-American loan agreement had apparently committed the government to end preferences, and the British were in an extremely weak economic position. Would they be able to limit American demands to fulfil the commitments of 1942 and 1945? The British government was in a perilous financial position in negotiating with the Americans, and also had an internal ideological difficulty in reconciling a commitment to multilateralism with a belief in planning. The issue was well expressed by Raymond Street, a leading spokesman for the Lancashire cotton industry:
multilateralism was inconsistent with too much planning at home. In a multilateral world you could not say beforehand that the cotton industry should be of such and such a size. You had to let the efforts and ingenuities of the exporters determine what size of an export trade was obtainable and that must govern the size of your industry. 24
The Labour party's commitment to domestic planning was complemented by a belief in international planning which led to 'a paradox long implicit in its ideology'. International forms of planning implied a loss of national sovereignty: how could this be reconciled with greater state control over the domestic economy'? Was it possible to strengthen control over the national economy and abolish economic nationalism through international planning which implied a weakening of national sovereignty? Clearly, Labour's definition of multilateralism was not the same as that of the State Department, as was already apparent in Meade's commitment to state trading. Dalton believed that multilateralism meant agreements between governments to create the most sensible forms of International Economic specialisation. . .the ultimate goal, must, I think, be a kind of supreme International Economic Planning Body, which would attempt to co-ordinate the various Agreements between Governments and producers, and would all the time be suggesting ways of improving agreements so as to secure a more sensible distribution of resources.
R. W. B. 'Otto' Clarke of the Treasury noted in 1946 that the combination of liberal international economic policy with planning at home led into a 'theological maze'. The tension was not only ideological but practical. A commitment to trade liberalisation was needed to secure American support, yet the British government knew the dangers to the balance of payments. The only way to proceed was to combine monetary and commercial multilateralism with a domestic policy of exchange controls, import controls and state trading for both ideological and practical reasons. As Attlee admitted in 1946, 'In certain specific points of world economic planning, we find the United States in agreement with us, but, generally speaking, they hold a capitalist philosophy which we do not accept.' 25 The tension between the two policy desiderata of internationalism and domestic planning was not easily resolved and dominated the decade after the war.
The proposals on trade were initially considered in London in October 1946 and then at a conference in Geneva in April 1947. In the words of Street, the negotiations were 'a business of unbelievable intricacy and frustration. A dozen nations all engaged in cross negotiations on tariff schedules of appalling complexity: never anything final: pull baker, pull devil interminably.' The problem for the British delegation was in deciding how far to go in meeting the Americans in a compromise which would create 'a barrier against an otherwise inevitable trend to economic nationalism'. Will Clayton, the assistant secretary of state of the USA, was in the same mould as Hull. In the opinion of Harold Wilson, he was 'nice and well-intentioned but woolly in his mental processes and dominated by rigid conceptions held in a sort of self-righteous haze'; his contribution to discussions 'often seemed like discourses on points of theological dogma or morality'. When he met Stafford Cripps in 1947, Clayton complained that the terms of the loan of 1945 had not been fulfilled and that Britain had only offered a 'pitifully small' elimination of three minor preferences out of sixty-three required by the Americans. By contrast, Clayton pointed out that the Americans were willing to make a cut of 50 per cent in tariffs on British goods. For his part, Cripps was unimpressed, arguing that preferences could not be abandoned without the consent of the Dominions, and that
The Labour Party, which a few years ago was generally opposed to preferences, has now changed its view and is substantially in favour of their retention. The great help afforded by the Dominions during the war was probably the reason for this change of view. We have, however, undertaken not to extend the preferential system and we can deal with the question of elimination by progressive reduction.
The Americans in general and Clayton in particular were treated as in need of education in the economic realities of the post-war world. Wilson was prepared to take a firm line, for he felt that the situation 'had changed a great deal since Cordell Hull saturated the State Department at Washington with his almost religious convictions on the subject of Tariff Reductions'. Wilson was therefore willing to take a robust line with Clayton and he went on the offensive at Geneva, arguing that 'the dream of multilateralism was fairly well bust', and that America had shown itself unwilling to make any real concession. This was a high risk strategy of facing down the Americans, threatening the entire success of the Geneva discussions and the future of the International Trade Organisation (ITO). The gamble paid off, for Clayton's demand for the total elimination of all preferences was seen as impracticable by the other American negotiators who realised that more would be lost if they did not come to a compromise with Britain.
27 The British were relatively content with their success at Geneva. The draft charter of the ITO and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were then discussed at a conference held at Havana between November 1947 and March 1948. Clayton placed great hopes on the trade charter:
Without it, nationalism would rule in the economic and political world, shattering our hopes for a prosperous and peaceful world. Between world wars I and II, nations had acted unilaterally in international economic affairs. Such action would benefit a nation only until other nations took similar action. In the end, all countries had been hurt and embittered. . .a charter for organizing the world effectively for international economic co-operation was urgently needed, as otherwise all efforts would prove futile; restored productivity would again bring unmarketable surpluses and starvation prices; any aid provided would be a mere palliative. . .The decisions taken in Havana would certainly fix the pattern of international trade for many years to come. There were only two roads open to the world, one leading to multilateral, non-discriminatory trade with a great increase in the production, distribution and consumption of goods and happier relationships between all countries; the other leading to economic nationalism, bilateralism, discriminatory practices, a lowering of the standard of living and bad feeling all around. It was up to this Conference to choose which road to take. 28 Here was a crucial moment in the formation of the post-war world. Would Britain be able to maintain some of what it hoped to have secured in Geneva, given its own financial weakness, the economic might of the Americans and the obligations laid down in Article VII and in the AngloAmerican loan agreement?
At the conclusion of the Havana conference, Wilson and Cripps commented that 'it has not on the whole gone well for us'. The terms achieved at Geneva were eroded, largely -the British complained -'because of a tendency on the part of the United States to appease countries other than ourselves -they had appeased us fairly extensively at an earlier stage -by making concessions contrary to both American and UK interests'.
29 The final comment is interesting: it was less that the Americans imposed their will on the British than that the Americans gave way on their own position, so that their hegemony was constrained. Furthermore, despite the erosion of the American and British position at Havana, Britain still preserved imperial preferences in the face of everything that had conspired against them since 1942.
In the initial talks in London and in the conference at Geneva, representatives of the under-developed world demanded quantitative restrictions and preferences between neighbouring states which were inconsistent with multilateral trade. They did not make much progress at Geneva, but many more under-developed countries were represented at Havana and the balance of power changed. Development became the central issue with the under-developed countries taking it as axiomatic that the Geneva text of the Charter was heavily weighted in favour of the 'big commercial countries'. In particular, the Latin American countries played a crucial role. They were concerned that America was turning its attention to the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan and that the fairy godmother of the North was deserting them in favour of Europe. Their acquaintance with socialist ideas had converted them to a form of international socialism in which the richer countries were under an obligation to the poorer countries to promote the economic development of these countries and to raise their standard of living up to that of the richer countries. 30 During the war, new industries developed in Latin America as a result of a reduction in imports from the United States and Europe; after the war, Latin Americans feared the revival of European competition. Their aim was to maintain quantitative restrictions and preferential arrangements to encourage economic development within Latin America, based on economic integration and import-substituting industrialisation. Their approach was clearly expressed by the representative of Venezuela in December 1947:
The equality embodied in the Charter must not be of the nineteenth-century type, which actually established disequality by making it impossible, for instance, for Latin American Countries to develop new economies. During that period they had furnished raw materials and had been a dumping ground for finished products. This had now been substituted by the just idea of economic interdependence for the welfare of all. A Charter would not be possible unless the old prejudices were discarded and instead modern dynamic principles of co-operation adopted. Such an approach clearly threatened multilateralism and might harm British export markets in the undeveloped economies. The British complained that the Americans had lurched from taking too rigid a line against the under-developed countries at Geneva, where they had to be pressed into compromise, to adopting too conciliatory a line at Havana. The Americans wished to bring as many countries as possible into the ITO on the grounds that 'in the present state of the world a comprehensive International Trade Organization is more important than the securing of a Charter with only limited adherence but which safeguards our and their position more effectively'. Perhaps it was better to have the undeveloped economies inside the ITO and under control than outside. The ability of the under-developed countries to secure concessions was made possible by a shift in the voting system at Havana. In an attempt to secure a compromise, the leading industrial economies abandoned their preferred system of voting weighted by trade, and instead adopted a franchise of one country, one vote. Rather than expressing gratitude, as was naïvely assumed, the majority of undeveloped countries could instead press for greater concessions that were deeply disliked by the British.
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One concession was protective or development quotas designed to restrict imports in order to develop the infant industries of undeveloped countries. The Americans opposed any such concession at London and Geneva, and at this stage the British urged a compromise that would meet the needs of the under-developed countries as well as safeguarding Britain's export trade. However, the Americans offered further concessions at Havana that weakened the control of the ITO and reduced the safeguards on British exports. Despite British concerns, there seemed no alternative but to accept. The second concession was the right to introduce new preferences. At Geneva, no new preferences were allowed unless a two-thirds majority of the ITO agreed that they were needed for economic development. At Havana, new preferences could be introduced provided they were within the same economic region and were needed for development. Since Britain was committed to ending its own preferences, there was an obvious lack of symmetry if other countries were able to introduce new preferences which would hit British export markets. The issue was finally resolved by inserting a footnote to the effect that an economic region could be defined in terms of integration as well as proximity -a definition that was specifically noted to cover the British empire. Hence Commonwealth preferences could be preserved, something at odds with the agreements of 1942 and 1945. 33 Although the British contemplated adjourning the conference, in the end Cripps and Wilson felt that they could not stand out against the Americans and reluctantly agreed to the terms of the charter. Wilson realised that Britain could scarcely pull out at the end of a long process of negotiation after working so closely with the Americans. Such a decision would puzzle other countries which were eager to develop links outside the Russian sphere of influence, and would cause consternation in western Europe which was reluctant to threaten Marshall Aid. Wilson concluded that doubts that may still exist as to the lack of positive advantage to our export trade must take second place. If we were to stand out at this stage we should do so practically alone. The Americans would undoubtedly be able to cast the odium of breakdown on us and thereby gain credit with all the under-developed countries, including nearly all the LatinAmericans and probably India and Ceylon as well. We should also have increased the risk that the Americans would not be able to carry through their programme of reducing their own tariff which is very much in our own long-term economic interest. . .Finally we should have no support from the Commonwealth, not even on the question of new preferences.
Above all, the ITO seemed a great step forward as a focus for energies working in favour of a restoration of multi-lateral trade in a world which increasingly conducts its trade on a principle of bilateral barter. It is important that such a focus should exist, particularly from the point of view of this country which cannot hope to recover viability at a tolerable standard of living without a restoration of the triangular flow of trade.
Wilson argued that a rejection of the Charter would destroy the ITO which was part of Labour's commitment to international co-operation; it would also place 'a potent weapon in the hands of the forces of isolationism in the United States'. 34 In fact, Congress did not ratify the ITO which fell foul of the 'perfectionists' who felt it was insufficiently committed to free trade and the 'protectionists' who felt that it surrendered too much. of Hull and Clayton were frustrated, and their hegemony was more apparent than real. In the final outcome, the Havana compromise was less unfavourable to Britain than Wilson claimed and certainly than might have been expected given the terms of Lend Lease and the post-war loan. American policy had to turn away from the pursuit of multilateralism and convertibility to a more gradual and realistic programme. In one
designed to supercede the bilateral agreements that formed the initial basis for the post-war recovery of European trade. Above all, the EPU would resolve the problems of liquidity that were holding back trade, and would be a first step towards multilateralism. The initial proposal was that each country would make a monthly return of its net balances; instead of each pair of countries settling their balances, offsetting claims would be cancelled and each country would be left with a single payment to the EPU as a whole. Payment was not needed up to a certain amount, but when the credit of the member was exhausted, payment would be required -partly in goldand the management board could force corrective measures. These measures would impose discipline in bringing the balance of payments of deficit countries back into equilibrium.
The EPU inserted some of the elements of Keynes's clearing union into the European monetary system, helping resolve some of the problems of liquidity and assisting in the liberalisation of intra-European trade. But the EPU also posed serious problems for Britain: what would it mean for the survival of the sterling area, imperial preference and Britain's identity as a major imperial power? Should Britain join this new European venture or maintain its separate identity? The British government was wary, for it wished to reconcile the EPU with the continuation of the sterling area and its status as a reserve currency. The British government argued that the strength of sterling was vital for the liberalisation of trade and convertibility so that any action to bolster it was beneficiala claim that was not entirely disingenuous given that about half of international payments were still in sterling. If Britain were to join the EPU, the government argued that it should be on different terms designed to retain the status of sterling as a key currency. They hoped that sterling would form a large element in European reserves and in clearings within Europe. Further, Britain wished to retain its existing bilateral agreements and above all to preserve imperial preference. The EPU also seemed to threaten British sovereignty in determining domestic economic policies. The British government was hostile to payments in gold, preferring to settle deficits through credit and wishing to have the right to discriminate against any country whose surplus went over a certain level. Such sentiments were complemented by hostility to active intervention in domestic affairs by the management board. Whether the British would join the EPU was an open question, raising as it did fundamental issues about its identity and its ability to pursue its own domestic policies.
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The governor of the National Bank of Belgium was rightly suspicious of the intentions of the British government: was it merely seeking to use the EPU when payments were in its interests, taking full part in its running whilst failing to carry any of the risks? He complained that
The British proposal was unacceptable since, in essence, it meant allowing Britain to continue to enjoy the advantages of its bilateral agreements, when that is more advantageous, while giving it access to the Payments Union when a settlement through that channel is better, without its having to assume any commitments under the Union or share any of the risk involved in setting it up. 37
The Americans were equally suspicious. If the bilateral deals continued, much trade would be outside the EPU and would evade the need to pay gold that the Americans felt necessary 'to facilitate the exercise of the classic pressures on debtors to balance their accounts'. However, the American administration wished to include Britain and the sterling area in any European system as a step towards the removal of bilateralism and discrimination. Eventually, the British government concluded that 'there was no hope of securing any material improvement on the Americans' proposals', and opted to join the EPU. 38 In the fraught negotiations 36 The best account of the genesis of the EPU is J. J. Kaplan The British reported that the US Treasury felt that 'the scheme was very different from that originally proposed by the United States'.
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Alan Milward goes so far as to see the EPU as a defeat of American ambitions to create full economic and political integration in Europe as a step towards full multilateralism. In his view, the American government shifted its attitude towards the sterling area, fearing that Britain, far from spearheading European integration as the Americans hoped, might withdraw into the sterling area and create a 'two-world' system based on 'hard' dollars and 'soft' pounds. Particularly after the devaluation of the pound in 1949, the American government realised that 'its real interests were more affected by the world-wide ramifications of British and sterling area trade than by Britain's role in Europe'. On this view, American policy was defeated and the European nation state survived. 40 Other historians believe that Milward exaggerates the extent of 'defeat', and Charles Maier is nearer the mark in seeing debates over international payments after 1944 'as a single post-war process, which comprised a passage from a sterlingbased system to one of dollar ascendancy. In this transition Americans learned that they had to prop up sterling even as they partially displaced it, since it remained such an extensive international means of payment.' Meanwhile, the British realised that the pound could no longer maintain its earlier dominant role: a modus vivendi with the dollar had to be found. As Maier points out, 'between the British recognition that the pound could no longer dominate, and American recognition that sterling still had a role to play, there was space for compromise'. 41 The process was not so much one of defeat of American policy as pragmatic adjustments to manage the shift from one core currency (sterling) to another (the dollar) -a process that is extremely rare and potentially full of danger for the world economy.
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The British realised that there was more likelihood of a compromise within the European negotiations than in the discussions that were taking place between America, Britain and Canada after devaluation in 1949. Both the British and the American delegates at these ABC talks were eager to make sterling convertible and were doubtful of European integration, and there was even talk of an Anglo-American currency union. But the discussions soon stalled. The British were loathe to deflate the economy and cut expenditure on social welfare which would be necessary to make British goods more competitive, and so strengthen the balance of payments as a prerequisite for convertibility. Instead, they urged the Americans to open their markets to sterling goods and to fund some of the sterling balances or, failing this, to introduce convertibility with restrictions on American imports into Britain through trade discrimination. As the British pointed out, 'if the Americans want convertibility and non-discrimination, they will get neither. If they are prepared to take convertibility without non-discrimination there is a chance.' The Americans could not accept this position in the ABC talks, and the British realised that the European negotiations offered more room for manoeuvre. Hugh Gaitskell noted in his diary that 'in the battle we shall have to fight [with the IMF and the US Treasury over convertibility and non-discrimination], ECA might become our allies'.
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In the negotiations over the EPU, the British dropped their impracticable ambition to make sterling a central element in European reserves. They reached a compromise on the use of gold at the expense of Belgium which was the only economy in surplus with the whole of Europe and therefore most eager to have payments in gold. Britain also secured American acceptance of the special needs of sterling balances, and other European countries came to share British concerns over a strong management board. In the view of Kaplan and Schleiminger, a compromise was struck between the major countries involved -the USA, Britain and Belgium -in a way that 'fairly reflected a balance of the countervailing perceptions of the three major interested participants' and 'served well the interests of the community as a whole'.
44 Furthermore, the outcome should be placed in a wider context of strategic planning. Richard Toye and Till Geiger argue that British ministers decided to join the EPU as a concession to gain US support for strengthening NATO and making a greater contribution to the defence of Europe. In their opinion, the US administration gained the technical outcome it desired over European payments, which in turn helped the British to strengthen the US commitment to NATO. Therefore, the British decision to join EPU. . .was the tale of a struggle to resolve competing obligations, and, in this case, of the pragmatic subordination of economic anxieties in the interests of military security. 45 Nevertheless, membership remained reluctant and guarded, and alternatives were soon proposed which would give a greater role to sterling, change the nature of domestic economic policy and threaten the Bretton Woods system of fixed but variable exchange rates. The EPU had made concessions to the role of sterling without removing the problems. By 1952, the issue was once more pressing. Marshall Aid was due to come to an end and the USA and Britain failed to reach an agreement on further assistance. The USA pressed for a commitment to convertibility and multilateralism which the chancellor in the new Conservative administration, R. A. Butler, was wary of giving. The US State Department was critical of British policies. In its view, the government was failing to take sufficient action against domestic inflation which was being fuelled by increases in social services' expenditure. Further, restrictive practices in industry and labour led to low productivity and hence to difficulties with the balance of payments. The Labour government's commitment to planning and to the use of agreements with unions and industrial associations to limit wages and dividends, complemented by controls over domestic and international competition, led to a 'low effort bargain'. The State Department was critical of this approach -and so were some voices at the Bank of England and Treasury. The sterling area was also seen as a source of instability. British policy was characterised as 'weak and opportunistic', and the State Department felt that 'it is difficult to provide assistance to a country without tending to accustom that country to a standard of living which depends on the continuation of US assistance and in a sense tends to postpone the necessity for becoming competitive and earning its own way'.
46 As Britain's balance of payments deficit mounted in early 1952, discussions turned to retrenchment and restrictions, but also to the more radical policies of Operation ROBOT which would restore convertibility by allowing the pound to float. This solution would have threatened the very basis of the Bretton Woods agreement and disrupted the EPU.
The initial idea of ROBOT was developed by George Bolton of the Bank of England, aided by Lucius Thompson-McCausland, and it was then modified in association with two officials from the Treasury's overseas finance division -Otto Clarke and Leslie Rowan. The acronym transactions of the royal historical society came from their names -with the further implication that it offered an automatic, effective solution to the difficulties facing the British economy. Even Clarke admitted that the proposal was so far-reaching that 'the imagination boggles at rushing it through'. 47 The scheme underwent a number of iterations over the next few months but the essential point was that the exchange rate for the pound would be set by the foreign exchange markets within a band of 15 per cent either side of $2.80. The components of the sterling balances would then be treated in different ways. 'Overseas' or external sterling held outside the sterling area would be convertible; 80 per cent of the balances held in the sterling area would be 'blocked' and turned into government bonds; and 90 per cent of balances held in the non-sterling area outside the dollar zone would be 'blocked'. Convertibility was therefore limited. The scheme was developed unilaterally, without discussions with the Americans, the Commonwealth, Europe or the IMF -a unilateral approach which would, to put it mildly, cause some surprise.
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There are different interpretations of the origin of the scheme. In the opinion of Alec Cairncross, it was no more than a panic reaction of a few officials to a temporary loss of reserves which was (correctly) opposed by others, for its adoption 'would have been disastrous, politically and commercially'.
49 There is no doubt that there was a sense of crisis, for Clarke feared a collapse of confidence and a loss of effective control over the situation which would lead to 'even more unpalatable action'. Similarly, Wilfrid Eady of the Treasury took 'a "catastrophic" view of the present balance of payments crisis'.
50 However, ROBOT was more than a mere panic reaction: it involved a different perception of both international and domestic economic policy. A second interpretation makes it a battle between fractions of capital, a bid for power by finance capital which was supported by the Bank of England as a way of reasserting the role of the City of London and sterling. On this view, the central issue was the restoration of convertibility rather than a solution to the balance of payments which should instead be corrected through deflation.
51 By contrast, Jim Bulpitt and Peter Burnham argue that ROBOT owed more to Clarke and Rowan at the Treasury than it did to the Bank, and that its motivation was domestic rather than external: to 47 create competitiveness and flexibility. By allowing the pound to float, domestic economic controls and regulations to protect the external position would no longer be needed, and a free market could be created:
Robot is usually interpreted as an external economic strategy with awkward domestic consequences. We consider Robot to have been primarily a market-based, domestic, supply side strategy, accompanied by the necessary external economic policy supports. In other words, it is plausible to see Robot as a means fundamentally to enhance the competitiveness of the British economy. 52 On this view, ROBOT was not a panic reaction or a bid for power by the City: it was a fork in the road between a free-market economy and a 'stultifying interventionist consensus'. It would have allowed the Conservative government to break the restrictive barriers criticised by the State Department and instil market discipline. Hence Nigel Lawson argues that the defeat of ROBOT was 'a missed opportunity of the first importance', marking the rejection of the 'liberating economic logic of Robot'. Instead, Britain continued for another twenty-seven years with 'the world's most rigorous, and thus most damaging, regime of exchange control', with 'an unhealthy obsession with the balance of payments at the expense of more important economic objectives and to the growing resort to harmful economic controls of all kinds -not least wage and price controls'.
On this view, what ROBOT could have done was eventually achieved by Mrs Thatcher and her chancellors -not least Lawson himself.
There is a clear danger of writing history with the benefit of hindsight. A reading of the contemporary documents indicates that the primary concern was convertibility of sterling which had implications for the restoration of free markets as a secondary consideration. Of course, this was most true of the Bank. Bolton pointed out that inconvertibility was possible during the war and post-war years when trade was largely in the hands of the government, but that the re-emergence of private trade and the growth of foreign transactions in sterling meant that the system was coming under strain. Non-residents were able to exchange their sterling by various stratagems at a 15 per cent discount so that there was already a 'leakage' from the sterling area. Controls were increasingly easy to evade as a result of the weakening of the regulation of shipping and trading, and the loss of public sympathy. Additional controls would be counterproductive for the very process of defending sterling would weaken it as an international currency, and might merely exclude British traders from international markets which would be taken over by foreigners. In Bolton's opinion, 'we have thus reached a point where we must recognise that inconvertibility of sterling in non-resident hands is not a policy which can long be sustained'. The choice was stark: sterling could be used as a domestic currency with the ending of its international status; or non-resident sterling should be made convertible to retain its role as an international currency. Bolton was untroubled by the consequences for the EPU which he felt (wrongly, as it transpired) was in danger of collapse because of the division between creditors and debtors. He felt that the result would be a split between those countries which were under the influence of the USA (such as Germany) and those who were identified with sterling (such as France). In other words, he hoped for a 'club' of European countries pegged to sterling. In his view, the solution was to replace the existing muddled system of theoretical inconvertibility and illicit convertibility with a clear division between inconvertible domestic sterling and convertible overseas sterling where the rate was set through the exchange markets. A secondary effect would be to 'restore the incentives of the price system'. The Bank realised that there were serious implications for 'the whole field of internal policy: -budget economy, tight monetary conditions, savings, incentive, harder work, more production, and the release of productive capacity for export -and also emergency cuts in dollar and other overseas expenditure'.
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Why would floating have these implications for domestic policy? On the face of it, floating could actually weaken incentives for domestic rigour, for a lack of competitiveness could be compensated by a fall in the exchange rate as happened in the 1970s. The result might be a failure to increase domestic productivity and at the same time to erode the value of sterling held outside Britain to the detriment of countries that had acquired sterling during the war. The Bank was well aware of the danger and argued that it must at all costs be avoided:
We can only afford to consider a 'floating rate' as an additional weapon to protect the currency, against the background of determined policy in other fields and a firm budget. Without that background it would only be an admission of failure and a step towards collapse of the currency. If we are going to ask the sterling area to take sacrifices and impose sacrifices on foreign holders of sterling, we must show that we are playing our part and, rich and poor, are making sacrifices to help in restoring the value of our money.
This implied controls over government expenditure, the strengthening of incentives and the restoration of price mechanisms -a massive change in government policy. If these steps were not taken, a 'floating' rate is a polite name for progressive devaluation and would be even worse than devaluation to a new fixed rate. . .An international currency must have a high degree of stability. Unless we make this objective clear, we are wasting our time in trying to make sterling acceptable internationally by giving it a degree of convertibility. 55 Clearly, Bolton's main concern was convertibility: changes in domestic policy were ancillary to restoring sterling to its position as an international currency. Would the changes in domestic policies be electorally acceptable given popular support for full employment, and could the commitment to discipline and competitiveness be made credible? As we shall see in the next address, Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson faced this issue of imposing rules after 1979 when the medium-term financial strategy was used to impose discipline on domestic economic policies. But this strategy was only possible after the bruising experience of the 1970s when floating did indeed allow the pound to fall with a lack of control over domestic monetary policy. There is every reason to believe that the same would have happened in the 1950s when the commitment to full employment and the dread of a return to the 1930s made stringent policies electorally difficult.
At the Treasury, 'Otto' Clarke was also in favour of a swift restoration of convertibility, though he felt that the domestic benefits were more significant. The difference from the Bank of England was one of emphasis rather than a major divergence of aim. Like Bolton, he started from convertibility before articulating much more clearly a vision of the British economy that was fundamentally different from the system of planning and controls that had dominated since the war. He remarked that I cannot help feeling that we make very heavy weather of convertibility. The whole subject has become so overlaid with dogma from the 1944 Bretton Woods discussions onwards, and our 1947 experience was so disastrous, that we really recoil from it. . .The crucial issue is whether you mean convertibility at a fixed or floating rate. There is nothing sacrosanct about a fixed rate (except the decrees of the IMF Founding Fathers). It is obviously much easier to be convertible at a floating rate than at a fixed rate.
Inconvertibility was not an option: it could only work on the basis of a sterling-based system or 'two worlds' of the dollar and sterling areas which was 'fundamentally escapist' given the weakness of Britain and the impossibility of isolating the sterling area from America. The real choice, he argued, was between convertibility at a fixed rate or floating rate. A fixed rate was not likely to succeed for it would mean a loss of reserves which Britain did not have; and countries in the sterling area would need to accept painful adjustments to maintain the value of the pound. The alternative was to float.
transactions of the royal historical society
Clarke explained that the advantage of a floating rate was 'the fact that the rate moves sets up equilibrating pressures on the economy'. If the rate fell, import prices would rise and so reduce consumption; and exports would be more competitive. 'The whole economy feels these movements, and adjusts itself to them.' By contrast, a fixed exchange would only mean an outflow of gold 'without anybody noticing it at all -and no adjustment until the Government decrees it; and then it is the Government's fault, imposing artificial restrictions, and the real conditions of life go on as before'. Clarke was clear about the implications:
These advantages of a floating rate are so terrific that formidable considerations would be needed to offset them, in present conditions. It is perfectly true that a floating rate makes for instability both in internal and external trade (it is terrible for planners). But of course when the pattern of prices, production, consumption, imports and exports is not the correct one for solvency, we can't afford to have it stable; we must have some forces at work which will set up incentives which tend to right it -and which act specifically on imports and exports (in this, unlike any fiscal or monetary measures, which are entirely universal in their application).
There was a danger of unemployment, for convertibility would allow holders of sterling to switch to dollars so that Britain would lose its 'soft' markets in the sterling area. But Clarke stressed that floating and convertibility could be combined with high employment 'if the structure and incentives are of a character which make the economy viable'. The problem, he argued, was that we have an economic structure which is built round a very large deficit with the dollar area, and this is the root of our balance of payments difficulties. We shall never overcome this particular difficulty if there are 'soft' markets abroad and a 'soft' home market. . .Once we get the structure of trade right, and the competitive power, I see no reason in principle why a floating rate should be damaging to full employment, except to the extent that our economy must always be flexible. . .in order to be able to adapt itself quickly. My own impression is that you need about 3% unemployment to achieve this, but if you get up to 1,000,000 or more it is self-destroying, as it was in the '20's and '30's.
Clarke was insistent that the only way to maintain the exchange rate was through 'the most vigorous action to develop our competitive power', rather than through the use of trade discrimination.
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Of course, the creation of 'hard' markets in the hope that it would stimulate competitiveness would entail a move away from the controls on competition that marked the post-war period. It would also involve a shift from limitation on profits and dividends designed to blunt wage demands. A positive commitment to incentives and hence to an increase in inequality went against widespread support for equality as both ethically just and economically efficient. need to be modified and the low-effort bargain reconsidered. This was a major undertaking.
Not everyone at the Treasury was convinced by Clarke's arguments. The critics were led by Robert Hall who was highly sceptical at this 'leap in the dark' and troubled by 'the probable effect on our economy of the complete reversal of policy which these measures involve'. He was well aware that the decision to convert and float would upset the trade-off between international and domestic policies reached at the end of the war:
The effect of all the measures proposed is to abandon the whole attempt to adjust ourselves to changes in world economic circumstances without resort to unemployment, to accept a serious deterioration in our terms of trade, and completely to abandon the attempt, which has in fact had only moderate success, to get some stability in internal prices. The measures are also likely to have the same effect on many other countries, ie to set up a downward spiral of the level of world trade as each country which is short of dollars tries to earn dollars by cutting its imports from other non-dollar countries. This happened during the great slump after 1929 and a great deal of thought has been devoted since then to trying to prevent it happening again. In the thirties there were serious political consequences in many countries from the unemployment and low prices which accompanied the slump, and these might again result.
ROBOT would, he feared, imply a return to the beggar-my-neighbour policies of the 1930s. As he saw it, convertibility would lead to trade restrictions and a 'downward spiral of international trade'. Countries in deficit with the dollar area would cut their imports from the sterling area for they could now convert their sterling balances into dollars with the result that Britain would have to restrict its imports. British exports would fall, and unemployment would rise from the current 400,000 to about 900,000. The depreciation of sterling would also increase the price of imports by up to 5 per cent, so reducing the standard of living.
We would in fact be serving notice to our own people and to the rest of the world that we had been forced to abandon full employment and a high level of trade as immediate objectives, in the hope that we can get back to them later on through exchange depreciation and a considerable alteration of the terms of trade between the manufacturing countries of the non-dollar world on the one hand, and primary producers and the dollar world on the other.
Meanwhile, the 'gravest consequences' would be felt abroad, threatening the EPU and economic recovery in Europe as well as the proposals to strengthen European defence. The prospect did not appeal to Hall: 'The danger of carrying out the full plan seems to be that it might be selfdefeating, ie the political effects abroad, and the industrial pressure at home, might lead to the demand for a return to the present system.'
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Treasury sceptics warned that 'There would be severe industrial unrest, and it would be political suicide for the Government -the discipline of the gold standard, the rule of Bankers etc.' Would the policy actually do any good?
Convertibility cannot make a weak currency strong or restore confidence. Everyone would make hay while the sun shone and we should be swamped very quickly. . .If we haven't got the resolution to get ourselves out of our present difficulties, why suppose that we should have more resolution when convertible? Surely we would simply choose the slippery slope of depreciation. 58 Indeed, the result might not be competition, incentives and a free market; it might be increased controls. 'It is all very well to say that a fall in the rate spreads through the economy and produces the necessary corrective action. But will it be allowed to do so?' Costs were sticky in Britain as a result of 'the soft markets sustained by our sterling indebtedness, and the discouragement to incentive produced by the shape and weight of personal taxation'. Failure to adjust might therefore result in 'something like war control conditions of the civil economy for a couple of years. Unless we can find a positive industrial policy internally, we shall be overwhelmed by the depression caused by your scheme. The exhilaration of convertibility will be slow to communicate itself to the general body of the people!'
59
The decision was obviously intensely political, and in many ways ROBOT appealed to the Conservative government as a way of restoring free markets. The chancellor of the Exchequer, Butler, was initially supportive, remarking that 'there is something to be said, politically, for moving towards the system by which individuals are influenced by the operation of the price mechanism, to make their own adjustments to changing economic circumstances'. But he also saw 'great uncertainties and risks', with painful adjustments to domestic prices and wages, and some increase in unemployment. Initially, Butler felt the risk was worth taking and he informed his ministerial colleagues that the alternative was between 'bold action now, when we could still control the situation, and an uncontrolled devaluation later in the year which would have disastrous consequences'.
60 Churchill was attracted by the proposal, but other members of the cabinet were deeply suspicious. Lord Cherwell felt that it was 'a reckless leap in the dark', and he had a point. The adoption of the scheme would look like a panic measure, whether or not there was a longer-term ambition of changing the fundamental nature of the 58 TNA, T236/3240 'Septuagesima plus -or Greek Kalends', 13 Feb. 1952. 59 TNA, T236/3243, 'Robot', W. Eady [?] to L. Rowan, 17 Apr. 1952. 60 TNA, T236/3241, third draft of memorandum by chancellor of the Exchequer: this was probably drafted by Clarke given the similarity of the phrasing to some of his own memoranda; T236/3241, notes of a meeting of ministers, 27 Feb. 1952.
economy. The immediate result would be to threaten much that had been achieved in the preceding years, for floating rates were contrary to the rules of the IMF at a time when the stability of the Bretton Woods system was seen as vital to economic recovery. Although the proponents of ROBOT argued that the Americans would be delighted to secure convertibility and non-discrimination, even they had to admit that the Americans would be annoyed by Britain's unilateral decision to renege on the agreement of 1944. Further, it would 'play old Harry with EPU' by splitting Europe into two camps, leading to the 'disintegration and economic collapse of Europe'. Anthony Eden, the foreign secretary, was alarmed by the effect on Europe, on unemployment and at the consequences for the European Defence Community -something that Lawson later dismissed as an example of Britain sacrificing its real interests to Europe. Whether Eden could so easily undermine the agreement on defence might be doubted. Further, there were potential difficulties at home. Could the Conservatives really contemplate the electoral consequences of an increase in prices and in unemployment? The dangers seemed too great and the cabinet therefore rejected the proposal in February and again in June 1952. In the words of Peter Hennessy, the post-war 'New Deal' triumphed in cabinet discussions, and 'the spectres of Beveridge's "Idleness" and "Want". . .pushed ROBOT beyond Butler's "art of the possible"'.
61 Britain, like the rest of western Europe, had struck a particular deal at the end of the war between different interest groups, and convertibility and ROBOT would have undermined the trade-off. In the words of Eichengreen and Braga de Macedo, Workers had to be convinced to trade lower current compensation for higher future living standards, despite uncertainty over whether management would keep its part of the bargain to reinvest the profits that accrued tomorrow as a result of labor's sacrifices today. Awareness of this problem rendered labor hesitant to agree. Governments reassured it by adopting policies and programs that acted as 'bonds' which would be lost in the event of reneging. They agreed to limit rates of profit taxation in return for capitalists plowing back earnings into investment. They provided limited forms of industrial support (selective investment subsidies, price-maintenance schemes, orderly marketing agreements) to sectors that would have otherwise experienced competitive difficulties. Workers were extended public programs of maintenance for the unemployed, the ill, and the elderly. The particular form taken by this settlement in Britain led to the low-effort bargain -but was there any realistic possibility of a different outcome?
The abandonment of ROBOT led to the emergence of the 'collective approach' -a final, impracticable, attempt to return to convertibility at a flexible rate. ROBOT was a unilateral scheme; the collective approach, as the name implied, would bring in the Commonwealth, Europe and the United States to reduce trade barriers and restore convertibility as the basis for growth in world trade. It was, claimed the British government, time for a new start with positive policies now that the immediate post-war problems had been resolved, for otherwise 'the restrictive policies which were inevitable for dealing with the initial post-war problems will become permanently embedded in the world economy'. Furthermore, a solution was vital in response to the cold war, for 'Economic instability breeds political instability. The lack of opportunities for economic progress both in advanced countries and in under-developed countries is both a check to national defence and a stimulus to Communism.'
63 Whether the other countries would agree was a moot point. The idea arose from the working party on convertibility set up by the Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Conference and was adopted at the Commonwealth conference in November 1952. The proposal rested on making European currencies and non-resident sterling convertible at the same time in order to prevent speculation. The USA was expected to provide a jointly managed support fund, and the exchange rate of sterling would fluctuate in order to reduce pressure. Import restrictions should be dismantled, though they could be retained against a persistent creditor -that is, the United States. Meanwhile, the USA should adopt good creditor policies. Imperial preferences should continue and rules against new preferences be relaxed.
The USA was suspicious given the expectation that it would provide a support fund for convertibility. Although Eisenhower initially seemed supportive, his cabinet was not and in Butler's words, they 'poured cold water on the collective approach'. 64 The USA preferred to maintain the EPU, European integration and the creation of the European Defence Community. They were now committed to a gradual return to convertibility which should, as Clarence Randall pointed out in his report for the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, depend on 'a strong internal economy willing and able to control its money supply and its budget as safeguards against inflation, sufficiently mobile to make the best use of its resources, and willing and able to save in order to increase its productivity and improve its competitive position in world markets'. The implication was that such a state of affairs did not apply to Britain. The Europeans expressed 'widespread distrust', for convertibility would threaten the EPU. They felt that the priority was internal trade liberalisation whereas the collective approach would divide Europe between convertible and inconvertible currencies which would lead to renewed trade barriers. Not even the Commonwealth and sterling area were whole-heartedly behind the scheme. India was not willing to peg to a flexible pound which would threaten the value of its sterling balances, and other members of the sterling area were lukewarm. Not surprisingly, the collective approach came to nothing. The outcome was a slow return to convertibility which was eventually achieved in 1958. In the end, there was no alternative except EPU, despite British doubts and ambivalence.
65
The collective approach was linked with a desire to restore capital exports which would assist those countries receiving funds, stimulate the world economy and contain the menace of Communism. Here, potentially, was a shift from Bretton Woods where capital mobility was sacrificed in the pursuit of financial stability and domestic economic policies. Attitudes to capital exports had changed from the period before the First World War, in part because of a shift in the nature of capital flows. Before 1914, most of the capital exports of the world came from Britain for investment in productive long-term projects that opened up the resources of the world. Between the wars, capital movements were widely seen as a short-term response to currency fluctuations and political uncertainties so that the result was speculative instability rather than long-term growth. Such a view appealed to one strand in American political culture. In Morgenthau's words, the aim of the Bretton Woods plan was to 'drive the usurious money lenders from the temple of international finance' -a trope in American thought that went back to Thomas Jefferson's hostility to Alexander Hamilton, continued in Andrew Jackson's 'bank war' with its opposition to the power of monopolistic financiers in an agrarian republic, and resurfaced in the People's Party of the 1880s and 1890s. 66 This strand of thought was much less powerful in Britain where hostility to bankers was more muted. Nevertheless, Morgenthau's words chimed with Keynes's dislike of 'casino capitalism' -the pursuit of speculative short-term capital gains rather than longer-term income streams. Keynes felt that Wall Street, and to a lesser extent the City of London, failed to 'direct new investment into the most profitable channels in terms of future yield' and were more concerned with liquid investment markets.
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The problem was particularly severe because of short-term international capital movements and overseas investment. As he remarked in 1933, Advisable domestic policies might often be easier to compass, if the phenomenon known as 'the flight of capital' could be ruled out. The divorce between ownership and the real responsibility of management is serious within a country, when, as a result of joint-stock enterprise, ownership is broken up among innumerable individuals who buy their interest to-day and sell it to-morrow and lack altogether both knowledge and responsibility towards what they momentarily own. But when the same principle is applied internationally, it is, in times of stress, intolerable -I am irresponsible towards what I own and those who operate what I own are irresponsible towards me. There may be some financial calculation which shows it to be advantageous that my savings should be invested in whatever quarter of the habitable globe shows the greatest marginal efficiency of capital or the highest rate of interest. But experience is accumulating that remoteness between ownership and operation is an evil in the relations among men, likely or certain in the long run to set up strains and enmities which will bring to nought the financial calculation. 68 Such an approach informed the thinking of the Labour party and its plans for a National Investment Board. The aim was to replace 'casino capitalism' and the assumed speculative and short-term nature of capital markets with what was believed to be long-sighted, rational investment in the hands of experts. 69 The policies of the post-war Labour government were designed to remove the power of capital markets in making investment decisions. The cultural meanings of speculation (shortterm gambling and greed) and investment (long-term and prudential) informed debates over post-war policy, and capital movements were widely seen as disruptive of stable currencies and of trade.
However, a case could be made for the revival of capital exports, and not only for the benefit of the international bankers of the City of London. Capital exports could help resolve two serious problems which were connected though not completely identical: sterling balances and investment in development to counter Communism. A consistent policy was needed to deal with both issues. Some areas faced a threat from Communism in the absence of a sterling balance (such as Vietnam), whereas other countries had a sterling problem without a threat from Communism (such as India). The two problems did coincide in south-east Asia and especially in Malaya where Britain was concerned by the threat of Communism. Malaya was the largest dollar earner in the empire, and raw materials from the area were vital to the British economy and to western Europe. The British government insisted that American funds were crucial for solving both the sterling balances and development, for Britain could not afford to fund the development of south and south-east Asia. Hence the Commonwealth conference would prepare a development programme to submit to the USA for assistance. The British government had sufficient self-awareness to realise that it could not approach America for direct aid for its domestic economy which would look like another scheme to help a bankrupt Britain, but it did, with only slightly more realism, hope that direct aid to Asia would appeal to the American administration as a way of resisting Communism, of relieving the world dollar shortage by strengthening the dollarearning economies of south-east Asia, and of improving the position of sterling. By these means, the whole world economy would benefit. The collective approach was therefore complemented by the decision at the Commonwealth Economic Conference in 1952 to make 'a special effort to provide additional capital for Commonwealth development by facilitating the financing of schemes in other Commonwealth countries which will contribute to the improvement of the sterling area's balance of payments'. 70 The collective approach was linked with the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in south and south-east Asia that was launched in 1951. It brought together Australia, Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and Sri Lanka to encourage mutual help in investing in the infrastructure and in human resources. One benefit of the plan was that it allowed a reduction in the sterling balances of India that were such a cause of concern since the war.
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The British government's ambition of increasing capital for sound development would only be possible if it could sustain internal savings and achieve a surplus on overseas account. It was not clear that the attempt would succeed, and in 1953, Reginald Maudling, the economic secretary of the Treasury, asked his civil servants for advice on 'how much capital we shall we able to export over the next year or so, and to what destinations this capital should go'. He was concerned by the competing claims on capital -to build up reserves, to improve the flow of funds to the Commonwealth, and the demands of foreign countries for capital which connected with the political situation in Egypt, trade negotiations with Uruguay and financial crisis in Brazil.
72 Treasury officials came to two different conclusions, following the same divides as at the time of Operation ROBOT.
On the one side was Otto Clarke, a leading 'Roboteer' who was -at first sight counter-intuitively -opposed to capital exports. A commitment to free markets might be expected to lead to support for active capital markets as occurred under Howe and Lawson after 1979. However, Clarke's approach was rather different from that of the later phase of globalisation which combined floating exchanges and capital flows. He felt that capital was better used at home. In his view, the balance of payments surplus of £300-350m desired by the government was already committed to repay debt, and that 'it is much more important from the point of view of our balance-of-payments to develop our own productivity and competitive power than to use our resources to develop other countries' productivity'. A current account surplus of £300-350m was equivalent to about 3 per cent of national income, and Clarke argued that the economy should be geared to this level in the same way that before 1914 it was geared to a current surplus of 6 per cent of the national income:
The need for this arises not because we want to 'invest abroad' but because we are a debtor country on an unprecedented scale and the nature of our indebtedness involves a liability to make great repayments whenever our creditors need them. We are trying to run a world-wide international banking and financial system with wholly inadequate resources in cash and this means that the pressure has to come on our physical resources to discharge our liabilities. Fundamentally, we cannot meet the demands on our creditors in cash when they arise; we must therefore be in a position to meet them with goods. . .It is anomalous therefore to talk about overseas 'investment' as being a claim on our resources; it is much truer to say that overseas 'indebtedness' involves pressure on our resources. A man with a mortgage on his house is not 'paying his way' if he is failing to meet his mortgage instalments even though he may be earning enough to cover his 'current' needs. . .For the UK, therefore, the term 'current surplus' is a misnomer, and it is positively dangerous to think in terms of 'investing' this 'current surplus'. In Clarke's view, 'the important thing is to be competitive and driving all round' so that British goods could secure overseas markets. In his mind, floating exchanges were combined with capital controls.
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On the other side was Robert Hall, a leading opponent of ROBOT, who argued that there was no incompatibility between developing British domestic competitiveness and overseas investment. He felt that there were 72 TNA, T229/543, R. Maulding to E. Bridges, 1 Jan. 1953. 73 TNA, T229/543, RWBC/55527, 'Overseas investment', R. W. B. Clarke, undated. already sufficient resources to proceed on both fronts and that 'it is quite impossible to reach this surplus [that is, £300-350m on the balance of payments] unless we are willing to make some loans'. The main problem was selling the right goods abroad at the right price which 'involves choosing the right rate of exchange, and getting enough flexibility into the economy'. In 1949, the government devalued because costs were out of line with world costs. As Hall pointed out 'one of the strongest arguments for a floating rate is that it allows a continuous adjustment of costs. But there are strong arguments for a stable rate', as was decided at the time of the debate over ROBOT:
The flexibility needed is secured primarily by having reasonably disinflationary conditions at home: it is a matter of judgment to get a balance between the social objective of full employment and the necessities of our foreign investment policy. In my view, we are at present somewhere near the right position now.
Perhaps more important is the possession of adequate capacity. . .It takes many years to build a new factory. Thus the whole question of investment policy is involved, and in my view we do not give enough attention to our long-term needs.
It was not enough to provide the right goods at competitive prices: the rest of the world would only buy British goods if it was willing to have a deficit with Britain -and that required foreign investment. Since it was easier to earn surpluses in sterling than dollars, the lending should be in the sterling area. A mutually beneficial bargain could be struck: the Commonwealth was short of capital for development and Britain had an interest in developing their resources, particularly in producing food and materials to reduce dependence on the dollar area. Might the Commonwealth control its dollar expenditure in return for additional sterling to be spent on approved development projects? Hall denied that it was better to invest in improving British productivity. Britain had sufficient resources to do both:
we cannot agree that sound investment in the Commonwealth does not improve our own balance of payments, just as did the 6 per cent of national income invested overseas during the first decade of this century. It will improve our invisible earnings from the Commonwealth, and should also improve the distribution of our balance of payments between the sterling and non-sterling areas, reducing our dollar deficit, which would be a valuable contribution to our balance of payments position. 74 Hall therefore combined support for capital exports and fixed exchange rates -a different trade-off both from that struck at Bretton Woods and implemented after 1979.
Although the sterling area was allowed to raise loans in London for general development in 1954, overseas investment was still limited and the Treasury remained cautious. Since the war, the Treasury's policy was to give exchange control approval to direct investment in the non-sterling area if there was a clear economic advantage defined as increased exports, protection of raw material supplies, and exploitation of a British technique or asset. Indirect investment in quoted foreign currency securities was only allowed if financed by the sale of other foreign currency securities in sterling area ownership.
In general our object in applying these criteria has been to improve the balance of payments within a reasonable period of time, particularly by stimulating exports (including the invisible export of know-how), and we have therefore on the whole looked for a net short-term return above the average. The Treasury's aim was to limit overseas investment by high domestic interest rates and tight credit in order to reduce the burden on foreign exchange resources as a result of capital export. 75 When Labour came to power in 1964, even the limited foreign investment under the Conservatives was considered to be far too high.
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As we will see next time, the revival of the City of London as a leading capital market was the result of a shift in American policy. As America's balance of payments weakened from the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations introduced controls on foreign investment which encouraged the holding of dollars in London. The growth of the Eurodollar market was exploited by the Bank of London and South America and its chairman, George Bolton, who had left the Bank of England. He realised that sterling could no longer survive as a major world currency and he believed that the best approach was to loosen regulations over the London financial market and exploit Eurodollars. In the 1960s, an American bank took a stake in the Bank of London and South America, and Bolton tried to build up an Anglo-American bank with a global reach. As at the time of ROBOT, Bolton was deeply suspicious of closer ties with Europe, and preferred a free trade area for the north Atlantic to membership of the EEC. 77 Here was a precursor of 'big bang' and the new global order of the close of the twentieth centurywhich is to look ahead to my final presidential address next year.
In this address, I have shown how the Americans' ambitions of the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 and the Havana conference of 1947/8 were modified in the face of economic reality. The transition to convertibility took much longer than the Americans hoped, and the return of multilateralism was delayed. The apparent American economic hegemony was constrained, and the British government was able to secure more than seemed feasible during the gloomy days of the war and postwar reconstruction. By the late 1950s, convertibility was restored and trade had recovered. Was it now possible to fulfil the ambitions of Cordell Hull and Will Clayton and return to multilateral trade -or had the emergence of the European Economic Community subverted their plans? For its part, the British government had still to decide on its economic identity: should it pursue a 'one-world' policy based on the dollar, a 'two-world' approach with the sterling area alongside the dollar, or should it throw in its lot with the Europeans? The issues that faced the Labour government in relation to the EPU were still on the agenda, though the context had changed. The dollar shortage of the post-war years was now giving way to a dollar glut as the American balance of payments weakened and the economies of Europe and Asia recovered -above all, those of Germany and Japan.
Here was the dilemma observed by Robert Triffin: liquidity for the growing world economy was provided on condition that the US economy was weak. Triffin feared that the result might be a repeat of 1931: he saw parallels with Britain's position at that time which led to the devaluation of sterling, the collapse of the gold standard and the world depression.
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An American deficit on its balance of payments was vital in creating liquidity for the rest of the world, but could the American government allow it to continue to grow with potentially damaging results for its international standing and ability to finance its strategic ambitions? One possible response would be to deflate the domestic economy to hold down demand for imports and release goods for export, but this would have damaging electoral results for whoever embarked on the policy. Neither could the American government devalue its currency to become more competitive, for the dollar provided the foundation of the entire system of pegged currencies so that all other countries would follow it down. The USA could not devalue, and the Bretton Woods system did not oblige countries with strong currencies -above all the Deutschmark and the yen -to revalue. Was the use of undervalued currencies to secure more trade any different from the 1930s? James Schlesinger at the Bureau of the Budget remarked that 'Undervaluing the yen, for example, by a full 20 per cent is a beggar-my-neighbour policy. There is no reason that the United States should be willing graciously to tolerate such a condition.'
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Currencies were, so it seemed, moving into disequilibrium with little ability to adjust.
By the early 1960s, the way was prepared for considerable tensions within the Bretton Woods system of monetary relations and trade policies. Shortly after his election, President Kennedy embarked on a new round of trade talks to reduce tariffs and to open up markets for American goods. How far did the 'Kennedy round' succeed in its ambitions, or did the concessions made to under-developed countries threaten American acceptance of free trade and serve to stimulate protectionism? At the same time, Kennedy and President Johnson attempted to make the American economy more efficient and productive by imposing controls over capital exports to stimulate domestic investment, as well as increasing public spending to solve some of the problems of poverty at home. In fact, the American balance of payments continued to weaken, a situation exacerbated by the mounting costs of the Vietnam war.
Triffin realised that the injection of dollars into the world economy was vital to provide liquidity, and that the only alternative was to create something like Keynes's 'Bancor'. Such an outcome depended on the ability of the international organisations created at Bretton Woods to implement reform. In the event, the IMF failed to take effective action to solve the 'Triffin dilemma'. Others adopted a more sceptical attitude to the dollar glut, seeing in it less a beneficial creation of liquidity than a form of dollar imperialism. Jacques Rueff (a leading French opponent of Keynes and member of the Mont Pelerin Society devoted to economic liberalism) and Charles De Gaulle complained that America was able to pay its deficits by printing dollars so that, in Rueff's words, it had found the 'marvellous secret of a deficit without tears'. It did not need to restrict domestic demand to deal with the balance of payments, and was instead exporting inflation, printing greenbacks to fund its military adventures and to buy European businesses. Rueff feared that there would soon be speculation against the dollar, leading to panic, deflation, tariffs and an inability to counter Communism. The Bretton Woods system, he remarked in 1962, 'places the whole economy in the situation of a man falling from the tenth floor: everything goes well at the start, but he can be sure that he is going to crash to the ground'. The system was, in De Gaulle's phrase, 'abusive and dangerous'. The answer was to 79 Memorandum from the assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget (Schlesinger) to the president's assistant for international economic affairs (Peterson), 20 July 1971, Foreign Relations, 1969 Relations, -1976 return to gold to contain the inflationary potential of democracy. 80 More realistically than a return to gold, the European Economic Community developed a plan for monetary integration: in 1970, the Werner Report set out a three-stage plan to create Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) within a decade, starting with a reduction in the fluctuations of margins between member currencies, proceeding to integrate financial and banking markets, and eventually fixing rates between the member countries with a convergence of economic policies. 81 The Europeans had little confidence in the dollar as the basis of the world economy, for in the words of the French President Georges Pompidou 'one could not eternally ask people to set their watches by a defective clock'.
Just how would the British government respond to these strains of the 1960s as its own balance of payments weakened, and the pound was devalued in 1967? Was it any longer feasible to maintain sterling's international position, and, if not, should it look to the United States or join the European initiatives? Should Britain turn away from the 'soft' markets of the sterling area towards Europe? These issues became particularly pressing when the fixed but variable exchange rate regime of Bretton Woods experienced a mortal blow in 1971: Richard Nixon suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold. Attempts to restore the Bretton Woods currency regime through the Smithsonian agreement later in the year failed, and by 1973 the pound was floating. Both in America and in Britain, the fears expressed by the anti-Roboteers came to pass: the ability of the pound and dollar to float downwards removed the need for monetary and fiscal restraints which led to inflation and to mounting budgetary deficits. By the late 1970s, it was clear that new 'rules of the game' were needed to impose discipline: the European monetary system, the Federal Reserve's tight money policy and Howe's mediumterm financial strategy which set strict limits to the growth of money supply. Lawson argued that the new policy was 'a belated unlearning of what were mistakenly believed to be the lessons of the war' -a rejection of the Bretton Woods consensus that fixed rates were the cure to the problems of competitive devaluations and beggar-my-neighbour policies of the 1930s. His view, following the work of Milton Friedman on the monetary history of the USA, was that the real lesson of the depression was that the Federal Reserve made a serious mistake in reducing the monetary supply in 1929-33, so turning a financial problem into a serious disruption of the economy. The correct lesson, he argued, should have been to ensure stable monetary growth rather than to reject orthodoxy. After the war, excess monetary growth was held in check by fixed exchange rates but was then threatened in the 1970s by the loss of constraints imposed by fixed exchanges.
82 The re-imposition of these constraints from the late 1970s through tight money led to domestic pain. Not only had White's and Keynes's adherence to fixed exchange rates been abandoned. Now, their commitment to capital controls to allow an independent domestic monetary was dropped. The policy choice in 1979/80 was a crucial turning point in the story, with a different pattern of beneficiaries and losers. It forms the subject of my final address.
